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Edward C. Luck
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Introduction
If the United Nations always succeeded or never succeeded in preventing atrocity crimes, then
there would be no point in trying to improve its performance. Instead, its track record has been
remarkably uneven. Its quiet successes at preventing mass violence have been more than matched
by horrific and well-publicized failures to prevent (or protect).1 Though it is impossible to measure
prevention with any degree of certainty, it appears that the world body has, on occasion, made a
positive difference.2 So, it has potential. But, in too many situations, that potential has not been
realized. This essay asks why the UN’s preventive efforts have been so inconsistent and how some
of the shortcomings in its performance might be remedied.
At the outset, this paper makes three assumptions. One, over the years, the United Nations has
been no worse at preventing mass atrocities than have been regional and sub-regional organizations,
governments, and/or civil society. Two, when prevention has worked, it has generally been because
there has been productive collaboration among actors of these various types and levels, so credit
or blame should be shared. Three, nevertheless, mediocrity on any actor’s part is not an acceptable
standard when it comes to an issue of public policy with such existential implications for human
life.
This essay argues further 1) that the United Nations has a unique combination of assets that
could be put to much better use in this area, 2) that shortcomings in its performance arise as much
from conceptual misunderstandings and institutional dysfunction as from capacity deficits, 3)
that these shortcomings have negative implications for whether and how effectively other critical
actors respond to the atrocity prevention challenge, and 4) that steps could be taken to improve the
situation significantly without a huge infusion of scarce resources. These points are addressed in
the following four sections on potential, shortcomings, implications, and remedies, respectively.
Potential
International efforts to prevent mass atrocity crimes require four core elements: legitimacy,
authority, capacity, and strategy. Legitimacy is the ability to generate and sustain political support
on the local, national, and regional, as well as international, levels for the preventive measures being
undertaken or contemplated and for the purposes being served. Authority, which may buttress
legitimacy, derives from those legal instruments and institutional decision-making processes that
confirm that those preventive actions are appropriate to the circumstances and proportional to the
purposes being pursued. Capacity refers to having and/or mobilizing and being able to employ the
requisite physical, material, financial, and human resources to carry out the preventive measures
fully and effectively. Strategy relates to the ability to assess and frame the unfolding situation
1

For the purposes of this paper, mass atrocity crimes are considered to be those identified under United Nations, General
Assembly Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, October 24, 2005 (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1), paragraph 138,
its discussion of the Responsibility to Protect, namely genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity. The terms atrocity and mass atrocity are used inter-changeably in this paper.

2

In his 2015 and 2016 reports on the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted
that preventive efforts by the United Nations and its partners had helped to prevent mass atrocity crimes and/
or their escalation in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, and Timor-Leste. United Nations, Report of the
Secretary-General, A Vital and Enduring Commitment: Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, July 13, 2015 (UN Doc.
A/69/981-S/2015/500), para. 8; United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action: The Next
Decade of the Responsibility to Protect, July 22, 2016 (UN Doc. A/70/999-S/2016/620), paras. 33 and 55. Twelve chapters
of the 2016 Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect are devoted to situations in which mass atrocity crimes
occurred or were prevented. See Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne, eds., Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 693-910. Also see Naomi Kikoler, “Guinea: An Overlooked Case of the
Responsibility to Protect in Practice,” in The Responsibility to Protect: Overcoming the Challenge of Atrocity Prevention, eds.
Serena K. Sharma and Jennifer M. Welsh (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 304-323.
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and the players involved both in a timely manner and from an atrocity prevention perspective,
to develop an effective plan for response to developments on the ground, to build a sustainable
coalition of actors on all levels willing to pursue the same objectives in a mutually reinforcing
manner, and to reassess and adjust the strategy as needed in the face of unexpected developments.
Ultimately, prevention is not completed until steps are taken to discourage a reoccurrence of such
threats of mass atrocities.
Legitimacy should be one of the United Nations’ prime attributes. The 193-member General
Assembly, the world’s only virtually universal political body, has endorsed both the Genocide
Convention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Though its decisions--other than on internal
matters—are not legally binding, the Assembly has, from its earliest days been the world’s prime
incubator of global norms and standards. Since 2009, the Assembly’s annual informal interactive
dialogues on R2P have shown broad and persistent support from the Member States for the
preventive dimensions of R2P, even as some delegations continue to express reservations about
possible coercive measures under the third pillar of the Secretary-General’s implementation
strategy (as crafted by this author).3 Successive Secretaries-General have produced a series of
well-received reports on conflict prevention, something which António Guterres has pledged to
make the centerpiece of his tenure.4 In many cases, moreover, the United Nations is more likely to
be perceived as a disinterested actor than would neighbors or more distant but powerful states.
Perceptions of impartiality should bolster claims to legitimacy. Multilateral measures are generally
assumed to be more legitimate than unilateral ones, as long as the measures undertaken by the UN
(or a regional body) are not perceived as being manipulated by a few powerful Member States to
further narrow national interests.
Authority should be another advantage for the world body. Its Charter gives the United
Nations ample legal authority for initiating preventive efforts and for building global-regional
partnerships to do so, as well as historically unprecedented authority for undertaking multilateral
enforcement action. Prevention is the first purpose mentioned in the Charter and Chapter VI lays
out a wide range of non-coercive tools for preventing and resolving conflict. Chapter VIII defines
the modalities for collaboration with regional arrangements in these pursuits, while Chapter VII
outlines the Security Council’s unsurpassed and historically unique enforcement powers.
Though enforcement is often thought of solely in terms of coercive military action, there are
a wide range of sanctions—relating to diplomatic, political, financial, and economic measures, as
well as restrictions on military assistance and arms transfers—that could be employed with greatest
effect early in a crisis for preventive and/or deterrent purposes, whether targeted on individual,
group, or national actors. Multilateral sanctions tend to be much more persuasive than unilateral
ones, so getting Security Council authorization can be an essential step. In the context of atrocity
prevention, it should be recalled that the Council’s enforcement powers override the constraints on
intervening in essentially domestic matters noted in Article 2 (7). Though the Charter is silent on
genocide and mass atrocities, it is replete with multiple references to promoting and encouraging
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. In that regard, the Security Council has the
authority to make referrals to the Intrnational Criminal Court (ICC), a non-UN body, concerning
the alleged commission of atrocity crimes. In a number of situations, UN representatives have
reminded local and national actors of this possibility.

3

In 2009, the General Assembly held both a short informal interactive dialogue and then a formal debate on the Secretary
General’s report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, of 12 January 2009, which laid out his three-pillar strategy.
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, January 12, 2009 (UN Doc.
A/63/677). This author was the architect of the strategy and the principal drafter of that report and all other statements
and reports by the Secretary-General on R2P from 2007 to mid-2012. Each year since 2009, the Secretary-General
has produced a report on different aspects of R2P to be addressed at informal interactive dialogues of the General
Assembly. The reports and summaries of the dialogues can be found on the web sites of the Global Centre on the
Responsibility to Protect and of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect.

4

The first major report, by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, was United Nations, Report by the Secretary-General, Prevention
of Armed Conflict, June 7, 2001 (UN Doc. A/55/985-S/2001/574). More recently, see António Guterres,“SecretaryGeneral-Designate Remarks to the General Assembly on Taking the Oath of Office” (speech, New York, December 12,
2016) United Nations.
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It is commonplace to observe that the United Nations’ claims to legitimacy and authority are
not matched by a reliable capacity to carry out its decisions and to forward its values. There is
much to this observation. However, this is more a commentary on its capacity for response than
for prevention, given that a coercive response under Chapter VII requires the mobilization of the
economic and/or military capacities of the Member States, as well as authorization by the Security
Council. The organization’s capacities for preventive action under Chapter VI and Article 99 (see
below)—even if only undertaken by the Secretary-General, the Secretariat, or other parts of the
UN system—do not necessarily depend on explicit action by the Member States. These preventive
capacities are quite varied and broad, if not deep or robust.
In terms of structural or upstream prevention, the UN system has a presence, whether for
sustainable development, humanitarian, human rights, peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and/or
conflict resolution purposes, in most of the countries of potential concern. In terms of operational
or more immediate preventive measures, when endorsing R2P at the 2005 World Summit, the
gathered heads of State and government agreed to support the United Nations “in establishing
an early warning capacity” and to assist States “under stress before crises and conflicts break
out.”5 Though the Summit authorized the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission (PBC)
limited to post-conflict scenarios, it should be recalled that the initial proposal for the Commission,
introduced by Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
in late 2004, envisioned it having an R2P-like preventive function as well. The first core function
for the Commission, according to the High-level Panel, should be “to identify countries which are
under stress and risk sliding towards State collapse” and “to organize, in partnership with the
national Government, proactive assistance in preventing that process from developing further.”6
The substantive parallels to the R2P language on assisting states under stress are striking. Yet the
fact that the preventive dimension of the PBC was not retained in the Summit articulation of the
purposes of the PBC is suggestive of the political hurdles that have to be overcome in some cases
of structural and operational prevention, as well as in crafting effective responses to unfolding
atrocities.
In terms of operational prevention, under Article 99 of the Charter the Secretary-General “may
bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the
maintenance of international peace and security.”7 Since 2009, this clause has increasingly been
interpreted as including the potential commission of mass atrocity crimes, whether in statements
to the Council by the Secretary-General, his Special Advisor for the Prevention of Genocide, or the
High Commissioner for Human Rights.8 The bully pulpit that the Secretary-General and his small
army of SRSGs (Special Advisers, Special Representatives, and Envoys) share can be critical to
getting preventive messages to would-be perpetrators, bystanders, vulnerable populations, media,
civil society leaders, governments, and regional arrangements. These messages have often been
about discouraging the incitement of atrocity crimes, something which all of the world leaders
agreed at the 2005 World Summit to prevent (paragraph 138 of the Outcome Document). In this
author’s experience, pushing back against indications of incitement has proven to be one of the
most flexible and timely tools in the prevention toolkit.
5

United Nations, 2005 World Summit Outcome, paras. 138 and 139, respectively.

6

United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility, 2004 (United Nations Department of Public Information), 83, para. 264.

7

United Nations, Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945 (United Nations),
article 99.

8

The inclusion of the four R2P crimes under Article 99 was proposed by this author to the Security Council’s Ad Hoc
Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa in December 2008. This has since become common
practice. United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 30 December 2008 from the Permanent Representative of South
Africa Addressed to the President of the Security Council, December 31, 2008 (UN Doc. S/2008/836), 13. Also see Simon
Chesterman, “Relations with the Secretary-General,” in The UN Security Council in the 21st Century, eds. Sebastian von
Einsiedel, David M. Malone, and Bruno Stagno Ugarte (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2016), 453. In his final report on R2P,
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon noted that “when the situation has required it, I have informed the Security Council
of atrocity crime risks and urged it to take early and decisive action. My hope is that future Secretaries-General
will continue to draw on the authority provided to them under the Charter of the United Nations.” United Nations
Secretary-General, Mobilizing Collective Action, 11, para. 39.
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Strategy, perhaps more than the other core dimensions, is an area under construction. Though
the General Assembly approved the Genocide Convention almost seventy years ago, the first
UN plan to prevent genocide was not articulated until 2004 to mark the tenth anniversary of
the Rwandan genocide (discussed more fully below).9 Since 2009, the Joint Office on Genocide
Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect has developed an all-encompassing Framework for
Analysis for the Prevention of Atrocity Crimes and the Secretary-General’s annual reports on
different aspects of R2P have placed a heavy emphasis on prevention. Though the UN was late to
framing concepts and strategies for preventing atrocity crimes, so too were governments, regional
organizations, and academia. In the 1990s, however, the UN was at the forefront of the articulation
of concerns about human security and human protection that continue to provide an intellectual
and political context for atrocity prevention.10 This intellectual heritage suggests that the world
body is in a position to develop a broader and more multilateral framework for preventing and
responding to mass atrocity crimes beyond the narrower perspectives of some governments, much
as it did in the case of counter-terrorism following the attacks of 9/11.
Shortcomings
It would be tempting, but overly sweeping and simplistic, to assert that the primary reason for
the UN’s underperformance in atrocity prevention has been because of the narrow domestic and
geopolitical agendas of powerful Member States. This may be the case in places, such as Syria,
Sudan, or Yemen, where the geopolitical stakes are perceived to be high and the UN’s entreaties
have fallen on deaf ears. The UN’s preventive efforts may well have had more success in low
profile cases on the whole than in high profile ones in which there have been more actors of
significance. Yet the UN has done relatively well in some places, such as Kyrgyzstan and Kenya,
where the stakes were high geopolitically and relatively poorly in others, such as Sri Lanka and
Central African Republic, where the international stakes were modest.
It may well be that the 193 Member States are simultaneously the greatest strength and
the greatest weakness of the United Nations. Either way, forging their collaboration on matters
of common concern was a founding purpose of the organization. So it is not enough for the
Secretariat—or for capitals or civil society-- just to lament the differences among key Member
States and declare some situations to be too politically sensitive to handle, especially when there
appears to be an imminent threat of mass atrocity crimes. The inter-governmental bodies provide
the mandates that the Secretariat has an obligation to implement, but the latter cannot be passive
bystanders to the political process. Their responsibilities are not limited to narrow interpretations
of the specific mandates they are assigned by the inter-governmental bodies.
UN officials are obligated both to act to further the principles and purposes of the Charter
and, as noted above, to inform the Security Council of possible threats to international peace
and security under Article 99 of the Charter. The latter entails taking proactive steps to gather
and assess the information needed to provide the Council and other relevant organs with
the Secretariat’s informed and considered judgements about situations of concern. As the
2000 Brahimi peacekeeping report famously commented, in the context of mass atrocity
prevention, the Secretariat has an obligation to tell the Security Council what it needs to hear, not
what it wants to hear.11 Too often, the Secretariat engages in pre-emptive self-censorship, trimming
their analytical sails before even testing the direction and velocity of the political winds. (There
have also been occasions, of course, when the Secretariat has exaggerated risks and potential
casualties.)
9

The reasons for this delay are discussed in Edward C. Luck, “Roots of Ambivalence: The United Nations, Genocide, and
Mass Atrocity Prevention,” in Policies and Practices for Preventing Atrocities, eds. Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff
(London: Routledge, forthcoming).

10

Tellingly, genocide prevention and mass atrocity prevention—the latter under the rubric of R2P--were among the last
entries in a long list of human protection concerns adopted by the UN. They were preceded, among other concerns,
by humanitarian assistance, internal displacement, children and armed conflict, sexual and gender-based violence,
women, peace, and security, and civilian protection in peacekeeping contexts. See Chapter One of Alex J. Bellamy and
Edward C. Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: From Promise to Practice (Cambridge, UK: Polity Books, forthcoming).

11

United Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 21, 2000 (UN Doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809).
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The long tradition of blaming the Member States for every UN failing has done little to enhance
understanding of how to improve the organization’s performance, especially in areas, such as
atrocity prevention, in which the Secretariat could, and often does, play a major operational role.
The Security Council’s growing willingness to hear from the Secretariat—and, in informal settings,
from civil society—about potential atrocity crimes has been an important step forward, but much
more could be done in the future to make this a more regular feature of Secretariat-Member State
collaboration.12 Little attention, for instance, has been given to the roles the General Assembly, the
Peacebuilding Commission, and the Human Rights Council could play in forwarding the atrocity
prevention agenda.
Though the Assembly, under Article 12 (1) of the Charter, may not make recommendations
on matters being addressed by the Council, it may discuss or investigate any matter. It has, for
instance, passed several pointed resolutions on Syria, reflecting broad frustration among the
Member States about the blockages within the Council on the situation.13 Under the Uniting for
Peace formula, the Assembly has a long history of authorizing peace operations under Chapter
VI of the Charter.14 Though such operations would not have an enforcement mandate, they might
play a useful function as preventive deployments in places where there are real possibilities of
instability and atrocity crimes. Under Article 11 (3) of the Charter, the Assembly has the equivalent
of Article 99 authority for referring threats to the Council. As noted earlier, the Assembly has been
the locus for efforts to refine R2P and to build broader Member State support for it. But it has
also been the forum for frustrating attempts to gain the human and financial resources needed to
mount a proper and sustainable effort to prevent atrocity crimes. For instance, a small minority in
the Assembly’s Fifth Committee has been able—or allowed—to repeatedly block the provision of
even very modest capacities to implement R2P, despite its endorsement at the highest levels at the
2005 World Summit.
As noted above, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) was originally conceived as an intergovernmental body that could deal with countries either sliding into or emerging from conflict. It
was established as a subsidiary advisory body both of the General Assembly and of the Security
Council.15 Though its pre-conflict function was dropped, it could still have a preventive role in
helping societies that had suffered sectarian violence from repeating the cycle. This could be a
significant preventive measure, as it has long been said that the best predictor of genocide is past
genocide. In its country-specific configuration, the PBC could potentially help draw economic
and political resources to situations of atrocity concern that have not received much international
attention. In practice, however, there has been relatively little overlap between the countries on
which the PBC has focused and those of highest priority from an atrocity prevention viewpoint.
As a 2015 review of the PBC underscored, for a variety of political and institutional reasons, it has
not been able to realize its potential for strategic leadership or for bridging the gaps between the
Security Council and the General Assembly.16
The Geneva-based Human Rights Council came rather late to the R2P debate for both political
and geographical reasons. However, the Council’s Commissions of Inquiry on the Democratic
12

Alex J. Bellamy, “UN Security Council,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim
Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 249-268; Edward C. Luck, “Prospects for Institutional Renovation and
Reform,” in The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, 2nd ed., eds. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, forthcoming).

13

The General Assembly, for instance, authorized the creation of a mechanism to investigate the alleged commission of
atrocity crimes in Syria. United Nations, Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 2016 (UN Doc. A/
RES/71/248).

14

Dominik Zaum, “The Security Council, the General Assembly, and War: The Uniting for Peace Resolution,” in The
United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution of Thought and Practice Since 1945, eds. Vaughan Lowe, et al.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 154-174.

15

United Nations, General Assembly Resolution (UN Doc. A/RES/60/1180); United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1645
on Post-conflict Peacebuilding, 2005 (UN Doc. 1645).

16

United Nations, Identical Letters Dated 29 June 2015 from the Chair of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of the
Peacebuilding Architecture Addressed to the President of the General Assembly and the President of the Security Council, June
30, 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490); United Nations, The Challenge of Sustaining Peace, Report of the Advisory
Group of Experts on the Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, June 30, 2015 (UN Doc. A/69/968-S/2015/490).
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People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and on Syria have both been outspoken about the growing
evidence of mass atrocity crimes, and the former invoked R2P and called on the international
community to address the dire human protection situation in the DPRK more vigorously.17 In late
2016, the Russian Federation failed to be elected by the General Assembly to membership in the
Human Rights Council, purportedly because of widespread concerns about the commission of
atrocity crimes in Syria.18 From the passage by the General Assembly of the Genocide Convention
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights a day apart in 1948, these two agendas have
followed parallel, not convergent, paths.19 Mutual respect and common purpose have been
combined with a sense of ambiguity and even ambivalence about the relationship between atrocity
crimes and human rights.20 In terms of implementation, the relatively large Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva and its much smaller cousin addressing genocide
prevention and R2P in New York have tended to have distinct perspectives on reporting and
institutional matters, even as they generally have viewed specific situations from similar but not
congruent perspectives.21 It was this author’s experience that the human rights conditions in a
country were not always indicative of its proclivity to mass violence. Some chronic human rights
violators were relatively stable, while some societies that were not among the worst violators, such
as Kenya and Kyrgyzstan, nevertheless witnessed sudden violence and atrocity crimes.
The pursuit of human rights is not the only seemingly natural partner for atrocity prevention
in which the relationship has had dysfunctional elements. In the case of humanitarian affairs, the
differences have run deeper, based on divergent conceptual and political assumptions that are
not easily reconciled. R2P, in particular, has not been embraced by many in the humanitarian
community because of its inclusion of the use of coercive military force as a response option
in extreme situations. As Hugo Slim has put it, the concerns of humanitarian actors about the
third pillar of the Secretary-General’s R2P implementation strategy “focus on four issues: the
politicization of civilian protection; raised expectations that tend to freeze conflicts and postpone
peace-making; the likely failure of force and the widening of conflict; and the contamination of
humanitarian agencies by association.”22
From an atrocity prevention or R2P perspective, the emphasis in humanitarian principles on
maintaining impartiality and preserving humanitarian space and access may entail prioritizing the
cultivation of good relations with the very regimes that may be committing or planning to commit
mass atrocities against their populations. These differences came to a head in the shaping of the
UN Secretariat’s response—the Security Council largely stayed on the sidelines--to the mounting
violence targeted at civilians in the concluding phases of the civil war in Sri Lanka in late 2008-early
2009. It was decided at the upper reaches of the Secretariat that the situation should be framed as a
humanitarian emergency, with the Emergency Relief Coordinator and the Office for Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put in charge. R2P and genocide prevention perspectives were
17

United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, February 7, 2014 (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/63) and Detailed Findings (UN Doc. A/HRC/25/CRP.1).

18

It is highly unusual for one of the five permanent members of the Security Council to lose such a vote. Julian Borger,
“Russia Denied Membership of UN Human Rights Council,” The Guardian, 28 October 2016.

19

It took several decades for human rights to gain a solid foothold in the UN Secretariat, and the first UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights was not appointed until 1993, 45 years after the Universal Declaration. Genocide
prevention took even longer, not gaining any presence in the Secretariat until 2004, as discussed below.

20

For largely historical reasons, the ten human rights treaty bodies addressed by the Human Rights Council do not
include the Genocide Convention. United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, Status of the Human Rights Treaty
Body System, July 18, 2016 (UN Doc. A/71/118), 2, para. 1. For the negotiating history of the Genocide Convention and
the singular role of Raphael Lemkin, see James Waller, Confronting Evil: Engaging the Responsibility to Prevent Genocide
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 15-23 and Samantha Power, “A Problem from Hell:” America and the Age of
Genocide (New York: Harper Collins, 2002), 51-60. For a discussion of the reluctance of the UN founders to embrace
genocide or atrocity prevention, see Luck, Roots of Ambivalence.

21

The appointment in 2010 of an Assistant Secretary-General to head the High Commissioner’s office in New York has
enhanced the opportunities for collaboration.

22

Hugo Slim, “Saving Individuals from the Scourge of War: Complementarity and Tension between R2P and
Humanitarian Action,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016), 555.
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not welcome in the deliberations, reports of mounting human rights violations were dismissed,
and the UN’s voice was muted as the war crimes unfolded.23
The internal review of the organization’s failures in the Sri Lankan crisis was candid about its
shortcomings and pointed to a number of areas needing improvement. The primary institutional
response was the enunciation of the Rights Up Front Action Plan by Secretary-General Ban in
September 2013.24 The Plan had many positive elements, including the development of more
coherent and streamlined means of collecting and integrating information on serious human
rights violations into crisis response planning at UN headquarters. From an atrocity prevention
perspective, however, the results have been more mixed. The differences in perspective between
the humanitarian and atrocity prevention views of the crisis in Sri Lanka were finessed rather than
confronted.
As Andrew Gilmour, at the time a key official in the Office of the Secretary-General and now
Assistant Secretary-General for Human Rights in New York, put it: “those involved in formulating
the initiative avoided getting into what was seen as an unproductive debate on the distinction
between the ‘protection of civilians’ and the ‘protection of human rights,’ as Rights up Front is
committed to both.”25 He goes on to note the common emphasis in Rights Up Front and R2P on
prevention and to underscore the concerns of some Member States with the possibility of using force
under an R2P banner.26 Though the use of force was never a desirable or feasible alternative in Sri
Lanka, the 1999 reports on the UN’s failures to act in a timely and decisive manner in the Rwandan
genocide and the massacre at Srebrenica highlighted the consequences of the UN’s reluctance to
take decisive military action when atrocity crimes were unfolding and it was a feasible option.27
The Rights Up Front initiative had significant implications, as well, for decision-making in
the upper echelons of the Secretariat. A Senior Action Group (SAG) was established, chaired by
the Deputy Secretary-General, to review a range of ongoing crises and to insure that human rights
perspectives were taken into account. Though probably a net positive for atrocity prevention,
SAG added little in those cases in which violence was not necessarily preceded by an escalation
of human rights abuses. It also helped to ease the demise of the Policy Committee, a high-level
group that had been chaired by the Secretary-General and that permitted more opportunities
for his Special Advisers to present the case for addressing particular situations from an atrocity
prevention perspective. This author’s experience suggests that there are risks in imposing any
barriers to the direct access of those mandated to prevent atrocity crimes to the Secretary-General
or in creating distance between the Secretary-General and his/her personal responsibility for acting
to try to prevent such crimes.28 That, after all, should have been one of the primary lessons from
Sri Lanka.
23

The report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel on UN Action in Sri Lanka of November 2012 was never
published, but it can be found on line (with some sections redacted). Also see Kimberly Nackers, “Framing the
Responsibility to Protect in the 2009 Sri Lanka Civil War,” Global Responsibility to Protect 7, no. 1 (2015), 81-108;
Kimberly Nackers, “Sri Lanka,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 876-894; Damien Kingsbury, “Sri Lanka,” in The Responsibility to Protect: The
Promise of Stopping Mass Atrocities in Our Time, eds. Jared Genser and Irwin Cotler (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2012), 298-315; Edward C. Luck and Dana Zaret Luck, “The Individual Responsibility to Protect,” in Reconstructing
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Another potential asset—the presence of UN peacekeepers on the ground—has proven to be
a mixed blessing. The record has been inconsistent. In Rwanda, Srebrenica, Sierra Leone, Darfur,
and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), mass atrocities occurred despite the presence
of UN forces. A moral hazard can be created when the promise of protection is not matched by
commensurate action by those institutions and countries with the capacity to offer protection, as
with the Security Council’s declaration of safe areas in Bosnia-Herzegovina.29 Yet in Mozambique,
Cambodia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali, the blue helmets
helped to prevent mass atrocities or their reoccurrence. In Kenya (twice), Kyrgyzstan, and Guinea
(Conakry), preventive efforts prevailed without an international force on the ground. In South
Sudan, peacekeepers have provided shelter for hundreds of thousands of civilians even as mass
atrocities escalated elsewhere.
Given this mottled history, it is not surprising that the United Nations has developed distinct,
if related, doctrines for the protection of civilians (POC) in a peacekeeping context and for mass
atrocity prevention and R2P.30 Those in charge of peacekeeping at the UN have tended to be quite
cautious about R2P for both political and conceptual reasons and about adding atrocity prevention
tasks to already ambitious mandates for over-stretched peacekeeping operations.31 The United
Nations, at this point, does not have a well-developed doctrine for the use of force, with or without
consent, for the explicit purpose of protecting civilians from atrocities or of deterring such crimes.32
It has relatively few cases from which to draw lessons and these scattered experiences have been
quite disparate. As Paul Williams puts it, “while it is understandable that the main practitioners of
POC (UN peacekeepers and the Secretariat) would like this agenda to remain as uncontroversial as
possible, pretending that these mandates can ignore the four R2P crimes or that they do not arise
from a similar sentiment as R2P-inspired military intervention is not helpful. Avoidance is not the
solution.”33
This conceptual muddle has not been simplified or clarified by the growing recognition that
non-state armed groups are—and have long been—among the more virulent perpetrators of atrocity
crimes. In 2008, when this author was Special Adviser, he introduced armed groups, including
those practicing terrorism, into the UN’s R2P lexicon, which previously had focused entirely on
governments as the sole perpetrators.34 Now, however, there is a real danger that concerns about
preventing mass atrocity crimes could be distorted or overwhelmed by the much larger narrative
and more widely embraced policy agenda on counter-terrorism. It is not entirely reassuring, in that
regard, that the first time that a Security Council meeting directly addressed R2P was in a counterterrorism context or that the Secretary-General’s 2015 report on conflict prevention included a
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section on “Violent Extremism and Atrocity Crimes.”35
The mother of all muddles, however, has been the UN’s conflation of conflict prevention
and atrocity prevention.36 When Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed the world body’s first
post and action plan to prevent genocide in 2004, to mark the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan
genocide, he apparently had no inter-governmental mandate to do so. Instead, he cited a Security
Council resolution on conflict prevention, which responded to his report on conflict prevention.
Neither document addressed the matter of atrocity or genocide prevention, despite the two mea
culpa reports in 1999 on the organization’s failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica.37 For the UN, the
temptation to make atrocity prevention a subset of conflict prevention and resolution can be
overwhelming. The Charter has countless references to preventing and resolving conflicts and,
as noted above, not one to genocide or mass atrocities. The UN—both its Secretariat and its intergovernmental organs—is highly sophisticated and experienced in the former and little more than
a novice in the latter. As they say, when your only tool is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
This would apply as much in the UN context to peaceful settlement as it does to the use of force in
the US government.
Though it is undoubtedly true that more atrocities occur within armed conflicts than outside of
them, experience has shown that horrific atrocities have occurred in a number of situations without
armed conflict. During the period when the author was Special Adviser, these cases included,
among others, Kenya (twice), Guinea (Conakry), and Kyrgyzstan, as well as the early stages of the
violence in Libya and Syria. The etiology of mass atrocity crimes may sometimes include armed
conflict, but that explains neither why atrocity crimes do not occur in all armed conflicts nor why
they often take place in other circumstances. Prevention, therefore, demands a broader yet more
dedicated understanding of the origins, course, termination, and possible reoccurrence of atrocity
crimes. The very process of conflict resolution may tempt one or more parties to resort to the
commission of atrocities to undermine the potential peace settlement, as may have been the case in
both Rwanda and Srebrenica.
Conflating conflict prevention and atrocity prevention presents challenges for practice as well
as for understanding and doctrine. For those engaged in mediation, keeping doors to the parties
open will generally be perceived as more important than relaying uncomfortable messages about
possible atrocity crimes. It was this author’s experience that warnings from UN headquarters to
parties in a conflict about behavior that was troubling from an atrocity prevention perspective
were sometimes seen by SRSGs in the field and officials of the Department of Political Affairs in
New York as too pointed or untimely. Governments are never eager to be told that their supporters
or armed forces are committing atrocities, especially when they are facing armed opposition and
their grip on power is threatened.
Sometimes quiet diplomacy, especially by the Secretary-General and/or senior regional
figures, can make a difference in preventing atrocities, especially when the regime is divided or
not fully committed to a genocidal project and the message is given relatively early. As noted
above, the advent of the ICC has added a critical talking point about the decline of impunity
and possible personal consequences for leaders in such situations, but that message tends to fall
on deaf ears when the targeted leadership already sees the struggle in existential terms, has the
backing of a permanent member of the Security Council, or the atrocities are being committed
by extremist armed groups. From a conflict resolution perspective, however, the invocation of
35

United Nations Security Council, Arria Formula Meeting on the Responsibility to Protect and Non-State Actors, December 14,
2015. The statement by this author is available on the web site of the Global Centre on the Responsibility to Protect.
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General, United Nations and Conflict Prevention: A Collective Recommitment,
September 25, 2015 (UN Doc. S/2015/730), 9, paras., 32-34.

36

Alex J. Bellamy, “Operationalizing the ‘Atrocity Prevention Lens’: Making Prevention a Living Reality,” in Reconstructing
Atrocity Prevention, eds. Sheri P. Rosenberg, Tibi Galis, and Alex Zucker (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2016), 67-69; Ruben Reike, “Conflict Prevention and R2P,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds.
Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 581-603; Edward C. Luck, “Getting There,
Being There,” in Oxford Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, eds. Alex J. Bellamy and Tim Dunne (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016), 297-299.

37

Luck, Getting There, Being There, 294-296.

©2018

Genocide Studies and Prevention 11, no. 3 http://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.11.3.1516

Why the United Nations Underperforms at Preventing Mass Atrocities

41

possible post-conflict ICC referrals may be regarded as a deterrent to a peaceful settlement that
could leave leaders vulnerable to prosecution. In sum, when conflict prevention and atrocity
prevention narratives converge, they can be mutually reinforcing, but often quite the opposite has
been the case.
Implications
As the foregoing discussion underscores, the fact that the United Nations is pursuing so many
related agendas simultaneously presents both opportunities and challenges for atrocity prevention
efforts. There is no shortage of symbiotic possibilities, both in the field and at headquarters. But
it is difficult to pursue so many policy streams at the same time and in the same place, as policy
coherence tends to be far more difficult to achieve than surface-level coordination. Early warning,
in this author’s experience, is much less of a problem than assessment and framing. Policy makers
with different responsibilities are likely to read the same information flows in distinct ways. What
are the frameworks and patterns within which policy makers understand, sort, and prioritize
the information before them? Why was Rwanda framed chiefly as a matter of implementing the
Arusha accords rather than of preventing a massive genocide? Why was it believed that Serbian
forces would not test the Security Council’s will to enforce the safe areas it had established? Why
was Sri Lanka regarded as a primarily humanitarian matter? And why were the early responses
to the growing violence in Syria couched as a question of regime change rather than as a question
of changing regime behavior and addressing the longer-term risks of mass atrocities, including
against the ruling largely Alawite minority? Can atrocity prevention perspectives, given their
chronically weak institutional positions, even get a voice at the key decision-making tables?
In this regard, the question of mainstreaming R2P and genocide prevention concerns presents
risks as well as opportunities. In his final report on R2P, Secretary-General Ban was anything but
ambivalent. The United Nations,” he asserted, “must redouble its own efforts to mainstream the
responsibility to protect. Faced with mounting challenges on multiple fronts, business as usual
will not be sufficient.”38 The common theme from the multiple reviews of related UN work in
2015-2016, he underscored, was prevention. Fair enough, but the price of gaining the benefits of
wider institutional visibility and greater conceptual coherence cannot be that atrocity prevention
becomes just part of the bureaucratic checklist of other, more robust, institutional mandates. In the
process of mainstreaming, it is essential that the singular perspective of atrocity prevention not be
lost. The goal must not be the typical bureaucratic blending of messages—for which the UN is well
known--but to maintain a distinctive and sometimes obnoxious voice for the prevention of mass
atrocities. It has been—and will continue to be—hard to have it both ways.
Finding a distinct voice can be particularly difficult at the stage of structural prevention,
when states under stress are not yet at a crisis point. As this author commented in 2001, in the
context of conflict prevention, structural prevention strategies can confront a “dilemma of
comprehensiveness” in which so many factors are perceived as potentially relevant that there is no
basis for coherent priority setting or policy making.39 If everything is critical, then nothing is. More
recently, the UN’s joint office on genocide prevention and R2P developed a Framework of Analysis
for Atrocity Crimes that is being employed with increasing frequency around the UN system.40 As
a checklist, it has some merit. But, with 14 risk factors and 143 indicators, the Framework does not
provide a clear basis for determining the relative weight of the various factors and indicators. Most
importantly, it lacks a dynamic dimension and a sense of which of these elements matter the most
in which situations. For those decision makers charged with making quick and critical decisions
in situations of acute concern, an over-reliance on such generic lists or templates could lead to the
overlooking of those characteristics that make each situation unique.
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For these reasons, it is understandable that policy makers tend to put a premium on operational
over structural prevention. Early engagement with societies under stress can be helpful for
developing familiarity with the local dynamics and for gaining a modicum of mutual trust. Being
engaged, however, is not the same thing as making a difference when push comes to shove. Mass
atrocities are not spontaneous events. They require some degree of planning and mobilization,
flowing from a series of destructive choices over time. The United Nations, regional arrangements,
neighbors, influential governments, and civil society need to recognize opportunities to interrupt
and disrupt such a chain of decisions and actions before they become irreversible. Some regimes
and armed groups, of course, are determined to take such a course and cannot be dissuaded.
Others, however, are reachable and perhaps persuadable through some combination of reason,
carrots, and credible sticks. Local partners can be invaluable, particularly from civil society, media,
clergy, the private sector, and parliaments. Where no such partners can be engaged because of
the authoritarian or totalitarian nature of the political and security systems, as in Syria or the
DPRK, respectively, then external actors have much less to work with and less chance of making
a difference.
In all of this, getting the framing right is essential. That is why this author based the SecretaryGeneral’s R2P implementation strategy on the premise of “early and flexible response tailored to
the specific needs of each situation.”41 That is also why efforts to smooth out R2P’s rough edges
so that it can blend better with other UN mandates pose the risk of missing the most valuable
and distinctive elements of atrocity prevention work. This was not meant to be a comfortable,
inoffensive quest. Crafting the most productive conceptual and working relationships between
atrocity prevention and its conflict prevention, peacekeeping, human rights, and humanitarian
cousins may take some time. As even Goldilocks discovered, it takes patience to find the right fit.
But the effort is worth it.
How these conceptual, doctrinal, and institutional matters are resolved will matter far beyond
the confines of the world body. As discussed earlier, the UN’s unmatched political legitimacy and
legal authority mean that what it does and does not do, where it does or does not speak out, matter
much more than its deficits in material capacities would suggest. It is not a marginal player when it
comes to atrocity prevention, in operational as well as normative terms, because of its catalytic role
in encouraging regional and sub-regional bodies, governments, and civil society to step up when
atrocities are threatened and societies are under stress. Each time the UN fails to utilize its voice or
to try to make a difference, it feeds cynicism about the prospects for preventing mass atrocities and
makes such crimes appear to be normal, if not acceptable. The world body, in that regard, has an
enduring obligation to keep hope alive.
When costs and risks are high, the UN may have trouble rousing others to action, especially
when its own Security Council is divided. But it has a responsibility to try to make a difference.
Time has shown that the absence of its voice can be deafening when it decides to look the other
way, as in Cambodia, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka. Each of its absences from the struggle for prevention,
just as its operational shortcomings, tends to undermine both its moral authority/legitimacy and
the strength of the norms, purposes, and principles for which it stands. In atrocity prevention,
people and governments expect the UN to demonstrate moral and political leadership. And they
notice when it fails to do so.
Remedies
Any honest enumeration of lessons learned about how to do atrocity prevention better is bound to
be both short and speculative. The base of experience is recent and scattered. Trying to prevent mass
atrocities is a recent endeavor, whether by governments, international institutions, or civil society.
The United Nations did not even begin to articulate a strategy—and that just to prevent genocide—
until 2004. Not surprisingly, the learning curve has proven to be quite steep. No one who has tried
to curb atrocities could ever claim it to be an easy or assured task. We are still learning how to do it.
It is essential to retain a profound sense of modesty about what has been accomplished and about
41
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what future prospects look like. Vulnerable populations should not expect the United Nations to
be anything close to a miracle worker, as it has at best proven to be a sometimes partner and/or
catalyst to prevention and, less often, to protection.
R2P, in this author’s view, offered two essential elements, both of which remain works in
progress. One was to underscore that the prevention of atrocity crimes imposes both individual
and collective responsibilities. Neither side of this equation will get far without the other. Notions
of collective responsibility bring collective action problems. As the UN illustrates all too well, in
this and most other areas, collective undertakings offer myriad opportunities for passing the buck.
Nevertheless, as noted at the outset, there is reason to believe that the unique political legitimacy
and legal authority offered by the United Nations and other inter-governmental bodies outweigh
the collective action dilemmas that multilateral approaches to problem-solving entail. Only
occasionally do other, more unilateral, avenues offer feasible and sustainable alternatives. The
collective action dilemmas associated with genocide prevention and R2P at the world body led this
author to emphasize the need for a parallel assumption of an individual responsibility to protect.42
As discussed above, the Secretariat can, and often has, acted without specific mandates from the
Security Council or other inter-governmental organs. Obviously, the best chance of making a
difference is when both individual and collective responsibilities are triggered at the UN and it has
willing partners at the regional, national, and local levels.
The second essential element offered by R2P was the possibility of drawing much broader
public, political, and media interest to prevention and protection issues. The fact that the assembled
heads of state and government at the 2005 World Summit endorsed R2P at a time when they could
not agree on many other matters was, in and of itself, quite remarkable. The Secretary-General’s
2009 implementation report generated the longest debate on any question in the General Assembly
that year, and there have been reports and Assembly debates (informal interactive dialogues) every
year since. The Security Council has referred to R2P in 62 resolutions as of June 2017, with the
frequency actually accelerating since the controversies over the use of force in Libya in 2011.43 The
academic and policy literature on R2P seems endless.
Much of the commentary has, naturally, been critical, but the essential point is that the advent
of R2P has undoubtedly spurred far more attention and analysis to the question of how to prevent
atrocity crimes and protect populations than had been achieved over the more than a half century
between the agreement on the Genocide Convention in 1948 and the ICISS report introducing
R2P in 2001. Whether that momentum is sustainable, however, remains an open question. The
progress with parliamentarians has been decidedly uneven and sporadic, and the discouraging
developments in Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan appear to have had a dampening effect. As of
spring 2017, 59 governments had appointed R2P focal points, but there is little uniformity in their
backgrounds or assignments.44 It may be that too much of the action has been at the UN in New
York and too little in national capitals.
Atrocity prevention and R2P continue to be much more political than technical or institutional
challenges, though progress on the latter could affect political calculations about what is possible
and what the associated costs and risks of engagement are likely to be. Among the steps that could
be helpful at this point would be:
•
•
•

Assigning a higher priority to identifying, discouraging, and disrupting incitement.
Developing global, regional, and national doctrine and capacities for preventive
deployments of peacekeepers and monitors in countries under stress, such as was done in
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Burundi.
Revisiting the initial conception of the PBC as an inter-governmental body concerned with
situations under stress and sliding towards conflict and possible atrocities as well as those
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•
•

•

emerging from conflict.
Reviving the convening function given to the Special Advisers for Genocide Prevention
and for R2P in the Secretary-General’s 2010 report on early warning and assessment.45
Initiating joint UN/African Union and UN/European Union assessments of lessons learned
from past efforts to prevent mass atrocities and of ways to enhance their collaboration
in operational prevention efforts in the future, including responding to incitement and
undertaking preventive deployments individually or jointly.
Preparing a report by Secretary-General Guterres on how atrocity prevention fits
thematically, operationally, and institutionally into his announced intention to prioritize
prevention strategies in the work of the United Nations.

None of these or similar steps could make much difference, however, without a more far-reaching
reassessment of the UN’s institutional culture when it comes to preventing atrocities and protecting
populations. Despite three wrenching mea culpa reports on Rwanda, Srebrenica, and Sri Lanka,
there remains a deep-seated resistance in the Secretariat and among the Member States to absorbing
the hard lessons of those fundamental failures. There have been two entrenched assumptions: one,
that the UN’s natural and proper stance towards parties should be one of impartiality and two, that
the use of force should always be a last resort. Neither assumption, in this author’s view, conforms
with the provisions or spirit of the Charter. Each has its place, but should not be applied uniformly,
especially when the risk of mass atrocities appears high and imminent.
The 2015 report of the Secretary-General on conflict prevention properly heralds the value
of impartiality for providing “access to a diverse number of stakeholders with whom we can
build trust and engage.”46 But it goes too far in asserting that the UN’s unique role stems from
“impartiality and the legitimacy derived from the principles of the Charter.”47 In fact, the Charter
never uses the term “impartiality” or anything similar, as this is an attribute for conflict resolution,
not a founding principle of the organization. There are times when the UN should be impartial
and others when it needs to take sides. To avoid the League of Nations’ debilitating shortage
of will and capacity, the founders of the UN did their best to prepare it to organize resistance
to aggression. In his report on The Fall of Srebrenica, Secretary-General Annan criticized the “the
general tendency to assume that the parties were equally responsible for the transgressions that
occurred,” which led to negotiations with those planning and executing atrocities that “amounted
to appeasement.”48 He faulted the “institutional ideology of impartiality even when confronted
with attempted genocide.”49 And he concluded that “the men who have been charged with this
crime against humanity reminded the world and, in particular, the United Nations, that evil exists
in the world. They taught us also that the United Nations global commitment to ending conflict
does not preclude moral judgements, but makes them necessary.”50
The founders would also be surprised to learn that it has become customary at the UN to
assert that the use of force should always be a last resort. That is far from what they had in mind
in crafting the Charter. In preparing the Secretary-General’s 2009 strategy for implementing R2P,
this author used the phrase “measure of last resort” instead. This was meant to convey the notion
that force was not a preferred tool, given its costs, risks, and consequences, but that it should not be
relegated to consideration as a final, desperate, alternative when all else has failed. The stance of
some Member States and members of the Secretariat that force should be regarded as a last resort
in a sequential or chronological manner runs counter to the goal of protecting populations and
to Secretary-General Ban’s early and flexible response strategy. Regarding the latter, SecretaryGeneral Annan’s report took his predecessor to task for speaking “against a ‘culture of death’”
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and for “arguing that peace should be pursued only through non-military methods.”51 He
acknowledged that “errors of judgement were made—errors rooted in a philosophy of impartiality
and non-violence wholly unsuited to the conflict in Bosnia.”52 And he pointed to “the pervasive
ambivalence within the United Nations regarding the role of force in the pursuit of peace.”53
More than two decades after these horrific failures to protect, the debate over R2P illustrates
how deeply these inhibitions continue to affect the effort to articulate and implement an effective
UN strategy for curbing mass atrocities. For instance, Brazil’s ‘responsibility while protecting’
(RWP) proposal, whatever its other merits, would have imposed both a sequenced approach
to R2P implementation and a series of standards for Security Council authorization for the use
of force in stopping atrocities that do not exist for the Council’s employment of force for other
purposes.54 That approach certainly would not have been among the lessons drawn from Rwanda
and Srebrenica.
Given these multiple obstacles, some imposed and others self-generated, it is striking that the
United Nations has had any success at all in helping to prevent mass atrocities. It has undoubtedly
underperformed, but its assets, particularly in terms of legitimacy and authority, are both real and
sustainable. There are unrealized capacities on the Secretariat side and the Member States could do
much more if they had greater confidence that their investments in the world body would pay off
and if they generally placed a higher priority on preventing atrocities and protecting populations. If
there is good news about unrealized potential, it is that there are substantial opportunities waiting
to be pursued. At every level—individual, local, national, regional, and global—curbing atrocities
is a relatively new enterprise that could take decades to nurture and develop. Possible synergies
abound. It is time to stop pointing fingers, to start taking responsibility, and to get to work on
building the kind of partnerships that could make a real difference over time.
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